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Abstract
Cyber security is a complex issue that requires a smart, balanced
approach to public-private partnership. However, there is not a simple
gold standard or mandatory minimum standard of cyber security, which
can cause friction in the relationship between government and private
industry. There are fundamental differences in these two unevenly yoked
partners: government's fundamental role under the U.S. Constitution is to
provide for the common defense; industry's role, backed by nearly a hundred
years of case law, is to maximize shareholder value. Further differences
are that government partners and industry players often assess risk
differently, based on their differing missions and objectives. To be successful,
both government and industry need to remain committed to the
relationship and continue working on it by understanding the complexity
of the situation, adapting where appropriate to their partner's perspective.
For the public-private partnership to endure and grow, an appreciation
of these differing perspectives—born from different legally mandated
responsibilities—must be reached. Ultimately, the government should
compensate private entities for making investments that align with the
government's perspective, such as the social contract, rather than mandating
that the shareholders subsidize the government function of providing
for the common defense.
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Abstract
Cyber security is a complex issue that requires a smart, balanced 
approach to public-private partnership. However, there is not a simple 
gold standard or mandatory minimum standard of cyber security, which 
can cause friction in the relationship between government and private 
industry. There are fundamental differences in these two unevenly yoked 
partners: government's fundamental role under the U.S. Constitution is to 
provide for the common defense; industry's role, backed by nearly a hun-
dred years of case law, is to maximize shareholder value. Further differ-
ences are that government partners and industry players often assess risk 
differently, based on their differing missions and objectives. To be suc-
cessful, both government and industry need to remain committed to the 
relationship and continue working on it by understanding the complexity 
of the situation, adapting where appropriate to their partner's perspec-
tive. For the public-private partnership to endure and grow, an apprecia-
tion of these differing perspectives—born from different legally mandated 
responsibilities—must be reached. Ultimately, the government should 
compensate private entities for making investments that align with the 
government's perspective, such as the social contract, rather than man-
dating that the shareholders subsidize the government function of provid-
ing for the common defense.
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Introduction
In presenting the annual threat assessment to Congress in 2010, U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said:
"The national security of the United States, our economic pros-
perity and the daily function of our government are dependent on 
a dynamic public private information infrastructure which 
includes telecommunications, computer networks and systems 
and the information residing within. This critical infrastructure is 
severely threatened…I am here today to stress that acting inde-
pendently, neither the U.S. Government nor the private sector 
can fully control or protect the country's information infrastruc-
ture. Yet, with increased national attention and investment in 
cyber security initiatives, I am confident the United States can 
implement measures to mitigate this negative situation."1
In stressing the need for industry and government to work together Mr. 
Blair, has simply repeated the U.S. Government mantra that dates at least 
to the 2002 National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space,2 and continues 
through the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and 
President Obama's 2009 Cyber Space Policy Review which all attest that, 
at least for cyber security,3, 4 government and industry need to operate as 
partners.
However, frustration with the persistence of the cyber threat has led some 
to question whether this marriage can survive. An alternative might be a 
more paternalistic model wherein government dictates to industry what it 
believes ought to be done to secure cyber space and to enforce these man-
dates with heavy penalties. This article will examine the current state of 
the pubic-private partnership for cyber security and some of the propos-
als to redefine it. It also will consider whether the current partnership 
could become more effective by adopting some principles from the litera-
ture on effective relationships.
The Once and Future Partnership
The 2002 National Strategy envisioned a partnership of equals wherein 
industry was expected to develop technologies, standards, and practices 
to secure expanding cyber networks. Government's role with respect to 
the private sector was largely confined to education, international coordi-
nation, and assisting with R&D. The strategy envisioned market efficien-
cies as sufficient to drive the adoption of protective measures.
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In the NIPP in 2004, the partnership was still envisioned as one of peers, 
although there was a greater definition of how the roles between the part-
ners would need to be managed:
"The success of the public private partnership depends on articu-
lating mutual benefits to government and the private sector part-
ners. While articulating the value proposition to the government 
typically is clear, it is often difficult to articulate the benefits of 
participating to the private sector…. In assessing the value propo-
sition for the private sector, there is a clear national security and 
homeland security interest in ensuring the collective protection of 
our nation's [critical infrastructure/key resources] CI/KR. Gov-
ernment can engage industry to go beyond efforts already justi-
fied by their own corporate business plans to assist in broad scale 
CI/KR protection through activities such as:
•   Providing owners and operators timely analytical accurate and 
useful information…
•   Ensuring industry is engaged as early as possible in the devel-
opment of initiatives and policies related to the NIPP…
•   Articulating to corporate leaders …both the business and 
national security benefits of investing in security measures that 
go beyond their business case…
•   Creating an environment that encourages and supports incen-
tives to voluntarily adopt widely accepted sound security best 
practices….
•   Providing support for research needed to enhance future CI/
KR protection efforts."5
Finally, the Cyber Space Policy Review claimed that while the foundation 
of the relationship seemed unchanged, the need for the government to be 
more proactive in working with industry was apparent:
"The government, working with State and local partners, should 
identify procurement strategies that will incentivize the market to 
make more secure products and services available to the public. 
Additional incentive mechanisms that the government should 
explore include adjustments to liability considerations (reduced 
liability in exchange for improved security or increased liability 
for the consequences of poor security), indemnification, tax 
incentives, and new regulatory requirements and compliance 
mechanisms."6
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To many, this proposition seems axiomatic. Since industry owns, oper-
ates, and, in fact, creates, the vast majority of the information networks 
that make up cyber space, and government operations are reliant on these 
private networks, securing them must be through a partnership. This is 
especially true since, as several of the aforementioned national policy doc-
uments point out, the government is looking for private investment in 
cyber security that may exceed an enterprise's commercial needs.7
Problematic Relationships
Partnerships between people, or businesses or government can be more 
difficult than one might expect. Lack of coordination of the partners' 
roles, responsibilities and expectations can lead to problems even when 
the partners in the relationship appear to have broadly aligned goals. 
Communication about these potential differences can be problematic, 
even if both partners in the relationship sincerely want the partnership to 
succeed.
Social exchange theory postulates that people enter into relationships 
based on the perception that rewards will outweigh costs.8 When costs 
outweigh rewards, people will seek other alternatives that are more bene-
ficial. If there are no better alternatives, people may stay in costly rela-
tionships, but feel less committed to them and behave in ways that do not 
enhance the long-term effectiveness of the relationship.
In the case of the public-private partnership to create a secure cyber 
system, it is unlikely that the private sector, at least writ large, can or will 
actually withdraw from their partnership with the government. However, 
a partnership that assumes static traditional roles and does not create 
tangible perceived rewards on the part of both parties could create a 
dysfunctional relationship lacking in commitment and proactive 
behavior. If such a relationship emerged, it could lessen overall security, 
which could have catastrophic consequences. Thus, with respect to cyber 
security, the management of the partnership itself may have more 
strategic significance than any of the more talked about operational or 
technical issues.
Signs of Trouble
To implement the public-private partnership for cyber security the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created a series of "sector coor-
dinating councils," each of which would have corresponding government 
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coordination councils. The basic idea was that these groups would work 
together to develop plans and procedures to implement the goals of the 
partnership.
Reviews of the partnership from the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) have been generally less than flattering. One example is their 2009 
report "Critical Infrastructure Protection Report: Current Cyber Sector 
Specific Planning Approach Needs Reassessment," which found:
"Although DHS reported many efforts under way and planned to 
improve the cyber content of sector-specific plans, sector-specific 
agencies have yet to update their respective sector-specific plans 
to fully address key DHS cyber security criteria. For example, of 
the 17 sector-specific plans, only 9 have been updated. Of these 9 
updates, just 3 addressed missing cyber criteria, and those 3 
involved only a relatively small number (3 or fewer) of the criteria 
in question…the continuing lack of plans that fully address key 
cyber criteria has reduced the effectiveness of the existing sector 
planning approach and thus increases the risk that the nation's 
cyber assets have not been adequately identified, prioritized, and 
protected. The lack of complete updates and progress reports are 
further evidence that the sector planning process has not been 
effective and thus leaves the nation in the position of not knowing 
precisely where it stands in securing cyber critical infrastructures. 
Not following up to address these conditions also shows DHS is 
not making sector planning a priority. Further, recent studies by a 
presidential working group…also identified shortfalls in the effec-
tiveness of the current public-private partnership approach."9
Other commentators, perhaps lacking the GAO's institutional imperative 
for dispassion have been less genteel. For example, in 2011 Jim Lewis of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) updated the 
CSIS Commission on Cyber Security's 2008 report by concluding:
"The cyber security debate is stuck. Many of the solutions still 
advanced for cyber security are well past their sell by date. Public-
private partnerships, information sharing and self-regulation are 
remedies we have tried for more than a decade without success. 
We need new concepts and new strategies if we are to reduce the 
risk in cyber space to the United States."10
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Redefining the Public-Private Partnership
For some the alternatives appear clear. Either we follow the laissez faire 
path advocated in the National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space or we 
move to a regulatory model, and their preference is clear—government 
regulation:
"Identifying progress in 2011 will be simple. If the nation passes 
laws and the administration issues effective regulations for criti-
cal infrastructure there has been progress. These should include 
mandatory improvements in authentication of identity for critical 
infrastructure. No regulations mean inadequate progress."11
While the dominant pattern of the industry-government partnership 
remains basically as outlined in the National Strategy released in 2002, 
there are more recent legislative initiatives that seek to redefine the rela-
tionship away from the notion of peers working together toward one more 
akin to a strict parent overseeing their child's homework.
One example of this strict hierarchical, paternal model is apparent in the 
so called "combined bill," which was drafted under the auspices of Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid's office as an attempt to merge competing 
comprehensive cyber security bills that emerged from the Senate Home-
land Security and Commerce Committees in late 2010. This bill would 
have defined components of "covered critical infrastructure" subject to 
federal cyber security mandates with a new compliance regime including 
penalties for noncompliance. The bill defined this new partnership this 
way:
"The bill creates a dynamic partnership between the government 
and private sector in which the private sector is responsible for 
enhancing security of the Nation's most critical systems while the 
government ensures effective oversight and compliance."12
This construction would appear to be a somewhat strained definition of a 
"partnership;" gone is the notion of the partners working together to solve 
problems. Instead, there is the assertion that industry must perform and 
government must judge. The notion of understanding the needs of the 
separate partners and seeking a value proposition to make the relation-
ship a rewarding one (this is consistent with Mead's notion of social 
exchange) is also absent, as are Baxter's ideas of a dynamic evolving part-
nership.13 And, the bill contains little or none of the specific tax, procure-
ment and liability or other incentives to spur private investment to fulfill 
broader national security goals as suggested in the Cyber Space Policy 
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Review. Instead, there is the comparatively simple assertion that industry 
will take on the role of providing national cyber security, and government 
will judge and enforce harsh civil penalties for lack of compliance.
To analogize this to a personal relationship, this type of relationship 
would be like one spouse saying to the other, "Honey, your job is going to 
be to do all the things necessary to secure our family. You will have to gen-
erate the money, buy the house, clean the house, pay the bills, buy the 
food, cook the dinner, have the kids, raise the kids, etc. My job will be to 
evaluate how well you do your job. And, of course, if you don't meet my 
specifications, there will be severe penalties." The partnership described 
in this construction is similar to a parent-child relationship, wherein the 
parent (government) feels the need to exhibit some tough love on an 
uncooperative and immature child (the private sector).
The analogy breaks down, however, when one realizes that in this case the 
"child" (industry) is actually far bigger, stronger, and has more resources 
than the supposed parent. Indeed, it is the parent (government) in this 
case that is ultimately reliant on the child for cyber security.
The notion that the private sector has been in some way unruly and needs 
to be disciplined by government is questionable. While industry cyber 
systems are vulnerable to attack—as are virtually all infrastructures his-
torically—the market has produced an array of effective means to protect 
their cyber systems. The problem is the lack of proper implementation of 
cyber security best practices and relatively simple fixes, like software 
updates and security patches. Indeed, public statements from the CIA and 
the NSA are consistent with research from such organizations as Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers,14, 15, 16 Verizon, and the U.S. Secret Service,17 which 
show that 80-94 percent of cyber events could be prevented or success-
fully mitigated by using standards practices and technologies that are 
already available on the market. The question becomes not what needs to 
be done, but how do we get people to do it? Will a traditional regulatory 
model work in this space, or does a newer model to address uniquely 21st 
century issues need to evolve?
The assumption that adopting a more paternalistic model of government 
regulatory mandates would be successful in resolving our cyber security 
issues is unsubstantiated. Cyber security provisions in laws like HIPPA 
and SOX have not been effective in securing the systems they apply to. 
Moreover, there are numerous reasons to believe government regulation 
may not work at all, some of which are outlined below.
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Forging a Solution: More Government Regulation Is 
Not the Answer
Cyber security is a unique issue area that is especially difficult to address 
through the traditional federal regulatory structure. President Obama, 
who was one of the most pro-regulation members of the U.S. Senate dur-
ing his tenure there, has observed that the interconnected nature of the 
Internet makes using regulations to secure it highly problematic.18
The underlying assumption of those who seek to regulate in this space is 
often that the technology is broken and simply needs to be brought up to 
code via regulatory mandates. In reality, the situation is not so much 
about faulty systems but that the incentives to attack the systems are so 
great. Virtually all the economic incentives currently favor those who are 
interested in conducting cyber attacks. Cyber attack methods can be 
acquired over the Internet. There are vast profits that can be made via 
cyber crime and the chances of being successfully prosecuted are virtually 
nil.
Moreover, the numbers of attractive targets for attack are virtually limit-
less, as defenses are almost inherently a generation behind the attackers 
and demonstrating return on investment for cyber defense is problematic 
since it's difficult to measure the effects of something that has been pre-
vented from occurring.
Our problem may not be so much that the systems are built with exploit-
able flaws or negligently maintained, as it is that economic incentives to 
attack the systems are so massive that even the best systems may be sub-
ject to compromise. There is in fact a growing body of evidence that sug-
gests that notwithstanding the technologies used, determined attackers, 
such as the highly sophisticated, well-funded and often state-sponsored 
attackers, the so called Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), will eventually 
succeed in compromising perimeter defenses.19
Even if regulation were desirable, whom should the government regulate? 
The vendors who make the systems or the users who purchase them and 
who may not follow the manufacturer's recommendations for keeping the 
software up-to-date and properly installed? Maybe the Internet service 
providers (ISP) who deliver the Internet traffic should be regulated or 
maybe all of the above?
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Moreover, even if government could magically create an effective set of 
regulatory mandates, the technology changes so quickly that keeping the 
regulations current would be a daunting task especially given the cumber-
some regulatory process which was designed to address the technology of 
the pre-digital age.
There is no assurance that government regulations if implemented would 
be effective. Regulatory processes tend to become adversarial quickly, and 
political pressure may be brought to bear to create a ceiling for acceptable 
behavior rather than the intended floor. Given this inherently political 
nature of the regulatory system, it is at least as plausible that the regula-
tions that emerged would be watered down much as campaign finance 
regulations are. For example, virtually every politician in the nation is 
able to attest that they are in compliance with federal campaign funding 
regulations, yet almost no one believes that the intent of the regulations 
has been served by this compliance.
Additionally, there is the possibility that government proscribed man-
dates could turn out to be counterproductive. For example, some legisla-
tive proposals have called for dramatic increases in cyber security 
auditing. Repetitive auditing takes security people away from doing actual 
security and instead forces them to spend time on overly burdensome 
compliance. In one instance, a multi-state enterprise reported that 
whereas they once did quarterly penetration testing (a highly effective 
cyber security best practice), the growing audit requirements now only 
allowed them time and resources to do annual penetration testing—a 75 
percent reduction in a security best practice because security resources 
were being diverted to regulatory compliance.
In a larger context, although cyber security is an important value, it is not 
the only value. Even if a set of regulatory mandates could work, they 
should be assessed in relation to their costs in terms of innovation, invest-
ment and job creation. A U.S. law would apply only to U.S. companies 
which are competing in a world market. While some industry is inherently 
tied geographically to the U.S., many industries, including defense, IT and 
manufacturing can and could become motivated to move their operations 
to less regulated locations if the cost of operation were driven up by secu-
rity mandates, just as businesses traditionally move to lower cost states in 
the Union. Not only would this outcome be inconsistent with the need to 
create more jobs in the US, but the notion of driving IT and cyber security 
expertise off shore has other negative implications.
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Enrich the Public-Private Partnership, 
Don't Change It
Faced with a growing cyber security problem and dim prospects for suc-
cess if the model is altered toward greater government control, an alterna-
tive approach would be to work on the government-industry relationship 
to make it stronger and more successful. This is the approach advocated 
by a group of major industry associations and civil liberties representa-
tives who reviewed this subject at the conclusion of the 111th Congress 
and presented the following conclusions in a white paper:
"The current critical infrastructure protection partnership is 
sound, the framework is widely accepted, and the construct is one 
in which both government and industry are heavily invested. The 
current partnership model has accomplished a great deal. How-
ever, an effective and sustainable system of cybersecurity requires 
a fuller implementation of the voluntary industry-government 
partnership originally described in the NIPP. Abandoning the 
core tenets of the model in favor of a more government-centric 
set of mandates would be counterproductive to both our eco-
nomic and national security. Rather than creating a new mecha-
nism to accommodate the public-private partnership, 
government and industry need to continue to develop and 
enhance the existing one."20
While the notion of industry and government attending "couples therapy" 
sessions is obviously impractical, there are a number of competencies that 
have been identified in literature dealing with successful human relation-
ships that may be adaptable to the industry-government partnership for 
cyber security. Among the principles that could be instructive are com-
plexity, perspective taking, and flexibility.21
Complexity
When humans enter into a voluntary relationship, it is usually based on 
an initial perceived similarity, such as mutual attraction, common inter-
ests, or occupation. Often people will make assumptions about each other 
assuming there will be other similarities that can be shared. In successful 
relationships, individuals come to recognize that the other is more com-
plex, and this complexity must be managed if the relationship is to 
endure.22 Individuals who do not appreciate the complexities of their 
partner often have less successful relationships.
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The cyber security partnership similarly emerged out of a perceived com-
mon interest in protecting the networks the partners shared. Out of this 
mutual perception evolved the sector and government coordination coun-
cils and other similar bodies, which are designed to provide the structure 
for the relationship.
While government does indeed, at least at the federal level, operate in 
structures closely aligned to their coordinating councils (Treasury Depart-
ment representing banking, Department of Defense representing defense, 
etc.), corporate investment in cyber security is not determined at this 
level. Cyber security investments and the adoption of best practices and 
standards are not run through industry sectors or councils, but are rather 
done individually by each company at the corporate level. As a result, gov-
ernment coordination with industry through the sector Coordinating 
Councils, while convenient and useful in many respects, does not ade-
quately reflect the complexity of issues industry actually faces in making 
the critical cyber security decisions that affect their government partners. 
For the public-private partnership to evolve toward maximum effective-
ness, this complexity must be appreciated, meaning that the partnership 
must become meaningful to industry at the business plan level.
While such an arrangement may at first sound daunting, there is a rich 
and successful history of similar industry-government partnerships for 
non-cyber infrastructure enhancement. For example, a century ago the 
hot technologies were electricity and telephone networks. Originally, 
these services were provided by private companies who served only areas 
that met their economic self-interests, which meant redundant competi-
tive services in high profit areas and little or no service to less financially 
attractive markets.
Policymakers realized that a great public service could be created by pro-
viding universal telephone and electric service, but that the natural eco-
nomics were unlikely to achieve this goal. Instead they resolved the 
situation by creating a "social contract," wherein the government essen-
tially guaranteed the private investment in telephones and electricity pro-
viders (thus turning them into public utilities) in return for the social 
good of universal service at affordable rates. In so doing, government cre-
ated an enduring and successful partnership for infrastructure enhance-
ment increasing the profits and operating margins of the private sector. 
Proposals modeled on this "social contract" theory for cyber security are 
described in The Cyber Security Social Contract and The Cyber Security 
Social Contract 2.0.23
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Perspective Taking
One of the major causes of relational difficulty is when one partner 
assumes that the other will behave as they would, thus not only fail to 
appreciate their differences, but not going the next step to "walk a mile in 
his shoes." In human relationships, perspective taking (closely aligned 
with empathy) refers to the ability to see things from your partner's point 
of view. While both industry and government may also have aligned inter-
ests with respect to overall cyber security, there are other interests under 
consideration that lead to different perspectives and assessments of oth-
erwise similar situations or circumstances.
Government's fundamental role under the U.S. Constitution is to provide 
for the common defense. Industry's role, backed by nearly a hundred 
years of case law, is to maximize shareholder value.24, 25 A general con-
sensus has emerged that the most effective path to cybersecurity is a risk-
based approach that encompasses an assessment of threats, vulnerabili-
ties, and consequences. However, government partners and industry 
players often assess risk differently, based on their differing missions and 
objectives.
Typically, private sector entities assess risk in terms of the economic con-
sequences. Firms may, and often do, decide to allow for a certain amount 
of insecurity (e.g., pilfering) as a cost of doing business if the investment 
required to create a higher standard of security is not cost effective.
Government has an inherently lower tolerance for risk because of their 
higher calling for citizen defense and they are faced with multiple non-
economic issues—including public perception and political consider-
ations. Furthermore, compared to private industry, government has a 
greater ability to simply create funding should they desire to do so. Corpo-
rations, on the other hand, may well come to a different conclusion on the 
need for various cyber security investments.
For the partnership to endure and grow, an appreciation of these differing 
perspectives—born from different legally mandated responsibilities—
must be reached. It may well be that government requires greater invest-
ment in cyber security to serve the national interest than a specific com-
pany requires for its corporate interest.
It may be unreasonable to assume that private companies will, or can, 
perennially make non-economically justified investments in cyber secu-
rity. The government should compensate private entities for making 
investments that align with the government's perspective, such as the 
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social contract, rather than mandating that the shareholders subsidize the 
government function of providing for the common defense.
Flexibility
A natural extension of appreciating that relationships are complex and 
can be facilitated when the partners can take the perspective of the other 
is the notion that the ability to adapt, to be flexible, is a valuable skill.
In the context of the cyber security partnership, this translates into the 
appreciation that there is not a simple gold standard, or mandatory mini-
mum standard of cyber security. The Internet is a network of networks 
operated for varying purposes in numerous cultures and operating with 
differing equipment.
Using existing mechanisms, the partnership will need to evolve a flexible 
set of standards which can be independently assessed for their varying 
degrees of effectiveness. With the creation of this "sliding scale" of effec-
tive standards practices and technologies, government will be able to offer 
varying incentives (procurement, liability, tax, insurance, streamlined 
regulation, etc.) in return for voluntary adoption of security measures. 
Enterprises might then elect to enhance their security because it appeals 
to their broad business interests rather than as a matter of regulatory 
compliance.
Conclusion
Just like any relationship, the public-private partnership is bound to 
encounter difficulties. However, it is impractical for one partner to 
attempt to seize control of the partnership and attempt to bend the other 
to its will. Instead, partners need to remain committed to the relationship 
and continue working on it by understanding the complexity of the situa-
tion, adapting where appropriate to their partner's perspective and evolv-
ing a flexible system of rewards and incentives to enhance the overall 
security of both industry and the government.
About the Author
Larry Clinton is President and CEO of the Internet Security Alliance 
(ISA). ISA represents major corporations from the Aviation, Banking, 
Communications, Defense, Education, Financial Services Insurance, 
Manufacturing, Technology and Security industries. ISA's mission is to 
Clinton: A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011Journal of Strategic Security
110
integrate advanced technology with economics and public policy to create 
a sustainable system of cyber security. Mr. Clinton is one of the clearest 
voices on cyber security and has been featured in mass media such as USA 
Today, PBS News Hour, The Morning Show (CBS), Fox News, CNN, C-
SPAN, and CNBC. He has also authored numerous professional journal 
articles on cyber security as well as being a past guest editor for the Cutter 
IT Journal. Mr. Clinton is regularly called upon to testify before both the 
U.S. House and Senate. In 2008, ISA published its Cyber Security Social 
Contract which is both the first and last source cited in the Executive 
Summary of President Obama's Cyber Space Policy Review, which also 
cited more than a dozen ISA white papers—far more than any other 
source.
References
1   Dennis C. Blair, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 111th 
Congress, 1st Session, February 2, 2010.
2   Executive Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 
February 2003.
3   National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006.
4   Executive Office of the President, Cyberspace Policy Review—Assuring a Trusted 
and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, DC: 
The White House, May 2009).
5   National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006 at 9.
6   Executive Office of the President, Cyberspace Policy Review—Assuring a Trusted 
and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, May 2009.
7   Ibid.
8   George Herbert Mead, Symbolic Interactionism Role Taking Role Making the Gen-
eralized Other, 1934.
9   United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: Current Cyber Sector-Specific Planning Approach Needs Reassess-
ment, September 2009, 2.
10   Lewis, James, Cybersecurity Two Years Later, January 2011.
11   Ibid.
12   Staff Draft Combining S773 and S3480, 111th Congress, August 2010.
13   Em Griffin, Communication, Communication, Communication: A First Look at 
Communication Theory (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2009); see also: Herbert 
Blummer, Symbolic Interaction (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969).
14   Aerospace Industries Association Annual Conference, Robert Bigman comments 
on Cyber Security, Washington, D.C., October 2008.
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4  No. 2
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.6A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for Cyber Defense
111
15   U.S. Senate, hearing before the Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terror-
ism and Homeland Security, Testimony of Richard C. Schaffer, Jr. Information 
Assurance Director of the National Security Agency, November 17, 2009, avail-
able at: 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-17-09%20Schaeffer%20Testimony.pdf.
16   PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Global State of Information Security, 2005.
17   Wade Baker et al., "2010 Data Breach Investigations Report," Verizon, 2010, avail-
able at: http://tinyurl.com/26cqfj2 (www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/
reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf).
18   Remarks by President Obama at the White House on cybersecurity, July 14, 2010.
19   Jeff Brown, "Disrupting Attacker Command and Control Channels: A New Model 
for Information Sharing," in The Cyber Security Social Contract:2.0 (Washington, 
D.C.: Internet Security Alliance, 2009).
20   Business Software Alliance, Center for Democracy & Technology, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Internet Security Alliance, TechAmerica; Improving our Nation's 
Cybersecurity through the Public-Private Partnership: A White Paper, March 
2011, available at: http://www.isalliance.org.
21   Hart R. P and Burks D, M., "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction Speech 
Monogaphs," 1972, 39.
22   Appelgate J, "Constructs and Communication: A pragmatic Integration," in R 
Neimeyer and G Neimeyer eds. Advances in Personal Construct Psychology, 1990.
23   Internet Security Alliance, The Cyber Security Social Contract:2.0, December 
2009; Internet Security Alliance, The Cyber Security Social Contract: Policy Rec-
ommendations for the Obama Administration and 111th Congress, 2008.
24   Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich.1919).
25   Carlton Investments v. TLC Beatrice International Holding, Inc., 1997 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 86, 45 (ct. of Chancery, New Castle May 30, 1997).
Clinton: A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011